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7.1  Introduction 
Federally legislated minimum wages, first enacted in the Fair Labor Stan- 
dards Act of  1938, are an enduring legacy of  the New  Deal.' While econo- 
mists may  argue the merits of  minimum wages-along  the lines that they 
impede efficiency and redistribute from poor and unskilled outsiders to the 
insiders of  organized labor, minimum wages are determined by  a political 
process. 
This process is highly partisan. The original minimum wage law was en- 
acted by a Democratic Congress. Periodically, the (nominal) level of the wage 
has been increased. But none of  the increases occurred during the 10 years 
since 1938 when the Republican party controlled at least one of the houses of 
Congress. Increases in the nominal wage have also been blocked or moderated 
by Republican presidents. 
Figure 7.1 shows that the real minimum wage rose steadily from the end of 
World  War  I1 until  1968, the end of  the Kennedy-Johnson administration. 
When the Democrats both defeated Dewey and regained control of Congress 
in the 1948 elections, the minimum wage, in  1988 dollars, was only $1.96. 
Four years later, when Eisenhower was elected, the wage stood at $3.34. After 
the eight years of the Eisenhower administration, the wage again increased, 
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but far less rapidly, to $4.00. After increases were passed in  1961 and  1966, 
the real minimum wage reached its all time peak, $5.44 in 1968.2 
The demise of the Great Society initiated a steep decline in the real mini- 
mum wage. Under Nixon the minimum wage fell-and,  without Watergate 
would  probably have eroded further-to  $4.78. The  1977 increases only 
moderated the decline, since double-digit inflation in the late seventies eroded 
the value of the increments. When Ronald Reagan took office, the real wage 
stood at $4.36. When he left, the wage had declined to $3.20. The increases, 
passed at the end of  1989, will recoup only a small portion of the substantial 
decline in the real minimum wage that took place in the eighties. (The 1990 
and 1991 entries in fig. 7.1 are based on the wage set by the 1989 law and an 
assumed inflation rate of 5%.) 
The purpose of this essay is to explore the history of congressional roll call 
voting on minimum wages, with an emphasis upon the recent increase enacted 
in 1989. We  begin, in section 7.2, with a more detailed look at the time series 
on minimum wages in order to more firmly document the partisan character 
of increases in the wage. In section 7.3, we briefly present a dynamic spatial 
model that we use to analyze roll call voting on minimum wage votes. The 
spatial model is based on the hypothesis that voting on nearly all issues, not 
just minimum wage but also foreign policy issues, regulatory issues, and so 
on, reflects a legislator’s general ideological orientation on a few “liberal- 
conservative” dimensions. In contrast, “economic” models of congressional 
voting are motivated by the premise that members of Congress seek reelection 
and therefore seek to match their voting decisions to issue-specific economic 217  The Spatial Mapping of  Minimum Wage Legislation 
preferences of  their constituents. After, in  section 7.4, critiquing the eco- 
nomic models, we, in section 7.5, directly address three previous “economic” 
studies of  roll call voting on minimum wages and show how  the roll calls 
analyzed in those studies fit into the spatial model. A systematic spatial anal- 
ysis of all (71) House roll calls on minimum wages between 1937 and 1985 is 
conducted in section 7.6. We  find that minimum wage voting is related not 
only to a “prolabor” or “economic” dimension but also to a “pro-civil rights/ 
anti-civil rights” or “social” dimension. In section 7.7, we present a more 
detailed analysis of events in  1989. Once again, the roll calls are highly spa- 
tial. Finally, section 7.8 contains some rough calculations that suggest that, 
for individual senators, support for minimum wages has waned somewhat 
over time. A brief conclusion then follows. 
7.2  Congress, the Presidency, and Minimum Wage 
In the introduction, we noted a most striking indication of the partisan char- 
acter of the minimum wage-no  increase has been voted when the Republi- 
cans controlled at least one House of Congress. We  would now like to anchor 
this observation more firmly by contrasting it with some simple, exploratory 
regressions of the process in those years when the Democrats had full control 
of Congress. We eliminate the war years and begin our sample with 1945; we 
end with 1990. 
For the years of full or partial Republican control of Congress (1947-48, 
1953-54,  and  1982-873), the time path of the nominal minimum wage, m,, 
can be described exactly as m,  = m,-,,  Similarly the real minimum wage, w,, 
is exactly 
where P, is the price level. In other words, given that the reversion of  the 
nominal wage cannot be altered with partial Republican control, the real wage 
atrophies with inflation. As  it makes no sense to include these “error free” 
years in a regression, we delete them from the sample, but we use the two 
equations as null hypotheses to test whether years of Democrat control repre- 
sent a different regime. Figure 7.1 shows both the real wage and, for periods 
of Democratic control of Congress, the nominal wage. 
When the Democrats have been in control of Congress since the war, the 
nominal wage (in spite of the fact that revisions to the law have always been 
separated by at least four years) increases quite regularly at an average annual 
rate of  7.1%. (The null hypothesis-zero-is  rejected at p  = .002.) Much 
of  the fall in the real minimum wage in recent years, is, from this perspective, 
a combination of higher inflation rates in the seventies and a prolonged period 
of Republican control of the Senate in the eighties. 
When the Democrats control the White House as well, the rate averages 218  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
9.3%. Divided government, with  a Republican president and fully Demo- 
cratic Congress, averages 4.6%. Sample sizes are small, however, for the 
comparison of Republican and Democratic presidents. On the one hand, the 
Republican  average  is  not  significantly greater  than  zero.  On  the  other, 
the difference between the Democratic and Republican averages is not signif- 
icant, either. A similar pattern of small differences appeared in other regres- 
sion~.~  The remainder of this section does not distinguish among presidents. 
We also reject the null hypothesis for the real wage. Table 7.1 presents two 
regressions where the natural logarithm of the real wage is the dependent var- 
iable. In the first column, the regressions include a constant, the log of  the 
lagged real wage, and the log of  the price ratio. The null hypothesis is a zero 
constant and unit slopes. The null hypothesis is rejected for the constant, the 
wage slope, and for the joint hypothesis (F-test). In the second column, lags 
of the independent variable are added. Under the null hypothesis, their coeffi- 
cients should be zero, but they are significantly nonzero. The regression sug- 
gests that the political process of  adjustment to the minimum wage has a 
lagged response to changes in the price level. For both regressions, one can 
compute a steady-state real wage assuming a constant rate of inflation. This, 
in contrast to the equation for Republican control of Congress, always shows 
a nonzero wage, but, consistent with our earlier observation that the nominal 
wage grows at 7%, a real wage that is decreasing in the inflation rate. These 
regressions suffice to show that the real-wage time series is quite different 
when the Democrats hold sway on Capitol Hill than when they must at least 
share power with the Republicans. 
Fully modeling the dynamics of  the real minimum wage  is beyond  the 
scope of  this paper. A major concern is that a nonmarket mechanism like 
Congress does not make a series of daily or even annual adjustments. Idiosyn- 
Table 7.1  Logarithmic Regressions for the Real Minimum Wage,  w, 
Variable 
Regression Model 
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cratic matters are likely to affect the exact timing of increases. Nixon’s vulner- 
ability during Watergate may have been instrumental to enactment of  the 1974 
bill that he signed after successfully vetoing a nearly identical bill in 1973; an 
exceptionally conservative Republican president may  have delayed any in- 
creases when the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1987. Once a 
package of nominal increases is eventually enacted (the 1977 bill mandated 
increases in 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981, and the 1989  bill in 1990 and 1991), 
further legislation has always followed the initiation of the last mandated in- 
crease. As a result, the real wage appears to be at the mercy of unanticipated 
inflation at least for several years after any bill has been signed into law.  In 
this section, we have found that how the wage changes depends on who con- 
trols Congress. We  now  present a model that enables us to understand the 
coalitions that form to pass legislation during periods of Democratic control. 
7.3  The Spatial Model of Congressional Voting 
In this paper, we present, in figures 7.2-7.4  and also in 7.7-7.1 1, a number 
of  “spatial maps” of each house of Congress. The horizontal dimension on 
each plot can be thought of as extending from the economic left, or prolabor 
side to the economic right, or promanagement. The top of the vertical dimen- 
sion represents opposition to civil rights, the bottom, support of civil rights 
legislation. 
Members of Congress are represented as points on the map. Legislator po- 
sitions are shown by  d (Northern Democrat), s (Southern Democrat), and r 
(Rep~blican).~  Roll calls are represented by  lines, known as cutting lines. 
Members on one side of  the line tend to vote “yea” on the roll call, those on 
the other side tend to vote “nay.” Members “very close” to the cutting line 
tend to split about 50-50.  Those very far from the line almost always vote as 
predicted. 
The  spatial model  (Enelow and  Hinich  1984) of  Congressional voting 
(Poole and Rosenthal 1991) asserts that any bill, regardless of  content, can be 
represented in a low (one- or two- ) dimensional space. This model reflects 
the fact that legislators’ positions on a wide variety of public policies are inter- 
related. For example, a legislator who opposes raising the minimum wage is 
very likely to have favored aiding the Nicaraguan Contras, to have supported 
Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, opposes cutting defense spending, 
supports a constitutional amendment to outlaw flag burning, and so on. In the 
language of  contemporary American politics, this collection of policy posi- 
tions would be held by a “conservative” and the opposite collection by a “lib- 
eral .” 
The consistency of policy positions held by legislators allows us to develop 
a spatial map on which we can place cutting lines not just for minimum wage 
votes but also votes on foreign policy, regulation, affirmative action, and so 
on. In essence, the two dimensions in the maps represent abstractions-the 
labor and civil rights labels are provided as simple heuristics. 220  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
How are the members of Congress and cutting lines placed on the maps? 
Many readers will be familiar with the related topics of principle-components 
factor analysis and eigenvector extraction. What we do is similar in spirit to 
these methods, but the actual techniques are quite different since they are re- 
covery techniques based on a maintained hypothesis of  probabilistic spatial 
voting. The techniques are explained in detail in Poole and Rosenthal (1985a, 
1991). 
The maps in Figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 are based on applying the techniques 
in a simultaneous, dynamic estimation involving every roll call between 1789 
and  1985.6 We  found (Poole and Rosenthal 1991) that throughout American 
history at most two dimensions suffice to capture about 85% of the individual 
decisions, even on close votes.  In fact, over 80% classification can be ob- 
tained with a one-dimensional model, essentially the horizontal projections of 
the points in the figures in this paper. 
We  also found that relative spatial positions exhibit remarkable intertem- 
poral stability, particularly since the Great Depression. As a result, we would 
get virtually identical spatial maps if we excluded minimum wage votes from 
the calculation of legislator positions or used different time periods in the es- 
timation. 
One important source of change in the maps (cf. figs. 7.2-7.4  with 7.8 
below)  is the position of  Southern Democrats. As the civil rights conflict 
evolved, they moved, as a group, to a distinct position at the top of the maps. 
But, then, following the passage of the Voting Rights Act in  1966, they be- 
came more similar to Northern Democrats. This movement, largely resulting 
from the replacement of old blood with new legislators with different locations 
(Bullock 1981) will, as we shall see in section 7.6, have a major impact on 
minimum wage votes. 
Quite typical of minimum wage votes captured by the spatial model are the 
three shown in figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4.’ The top panels of  figures 7.2 and 
7.3 show those who voted yes and were paired or announced yes, and the 
bottom panels show those who voted no or were paired and announced no. 
The top panel of  figure 7.4 shows those individuals who took the “liberal” 
position of voting against the Erlenborn amendment but for final passage on 
the (successfully vetoed) 1973 bill. The middle panel shows those who voted 
“moderate” by supporting both the amendment and the bill, while the bottom 
panel  shows the “conservative” position of  voting for the amendment and 
against the bill. Classification errors for figures 7.2 and 7.3 are those individ- 
uals on the “wrong” side of the cutting line. (Figure 7.4 is discussed in section 
7.5.) The two figures represent correct classification of 84% and 93% respec- 
tively. Even higher classifications could be obtained from cutting lines chosen 
to minimize classification error rather than to maximize a likelihood function. 
In a nutshell, votes can be correctly classified on the basis of the legislator’s 
general ideological orientation, without recourse to information about the spe- 
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Inspection of the figures reveals that while legislators tend to vote along 
party lines, there is considerable diversity within each party.8  Most important, 
minimum wage votes tend to split both parties, with some liberal Republicans 
joining Northern Democrats and with Southern Democrats historically voting 
with the Republicans. Political scientists describe the alliance of the Southern 
Democrats and  the Republicans as the “conservative coalition.” Minimum 
wage is a conservative coalition issue. While a three-party (Northern Demo- 
crats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans) model will classify much better 
than a two-party model, figures 7.2-7.4  show that a three-party model is still 
inferior to a spatial model. The three-party model fails to tell us which South- 
ern Democrats are likely to oppose minimum wage and which Republicans 
are likely to break party ranks and support minimum wage. In contrast, the 
spatial model can capture the diversity within party and regional blocs. 
7.4  Economic Models 
Economic models link roll call voting to demographic measures and mea- 
sures of  costs and benefits. Peltzman (1984) investigated a large set of  roll 
calls in an analysis that included a bevy of sociodemographic and economic 
variables, party, and an interest group rating. He found that after controlling 
for constituency interest measures, the marginal effects of party and interest 
group rating were small. Peltzman’s methodology has two weaknesses. First, 
interest group ratings lose some information, since they are folded (Poole and 
Daniels 1985) and not fine grained (Cox and McCubbins 1991, chap. 6). Sec- 
ond, there is no investigation of the marginal explanatory power of the con- 
stituency interest variables once an ideology measure has been used. We  car- 
ried out this exercise (Poole and Rosenthal 1985b) and found that broad-brush 
measures of economic interests made little contribution to classification after 
controlling for spatial position. 
Unlike Peltzman’s analysis of large numbers of  roll calls on a variety of 
issues, Kalt and Zupan (1984) focused on strip-mining voting. Although they 
were careful in  accounting for constituency interests, they found that long- 
term ideology was  an  important determinant of  roll  call voting behavior. 
Reanalyzing their data, we found (Poole and Rosenthal 1985b) that the eco- 
nomic variables made only a small, very marginal contribution to classifica- 
tion once our spatial positions were 
In Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast (1989), the enactment of the Interstate 
Commerce Act  was  modeled as a trade-off, made within the institutional 
structure of Congress, of  interests on the short-haul pricing constraint issue 
and the issue of regulating by  statute rather than by regulatory commission.I0 
Their empirical work is a standard “economic” analysis. Since no interest 
group ratings were available for 1887, they could not run the type of  tests 
performed by Kalt and Zupan.L1  But party is significant, even with the “eco- 
nomic” controls. 224  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
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Erlenborn (R-Illinois) amendment and passage, June 1973, House  of 
Similarly, previous research on minimum wage voting by  Bloch (1980), 
Silberman and Durden (1976), and Krehbiel and Rivers (1988) has shown that 
measures of constituency interest,  in terms of  wage levels, unemployment 
levels, and union membership, are far less important to voting decisions than 
party membership. For example, Krehbiel and Rivers (1988; hereafter K-R), 
in an ordered probit analysis of  1977 votes on minimum wage amendments, 
found that Democrats, ceteris paribus, would prefer a minimum wage  17$- 
22$ higher than Republicans, whereas a 10% increase in the percentage of the 
labor force belonging to unions in the state would induce a preferred increase 
in the minimum wage of  under 8$. Similar conclusions can be drawn from 
Bloch’s probits on 1966 and 1974 Senate voting. In disaggregated results for 
each party, Bloch found that neither the wage nor the union variable was sig- 
nificant at the conventional 0.05 level in  1966. To  put matters simply, two 
senators from the same state will tend to oppose each other on minimum wage 
if  they are from different parties. The partisan effect overwhelms aggregate 
measures of constituency interest. 226  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
7.5  The Spatial Model and the Economic Model Compared: The 
Senate in 1977 
“Ideology,” as measured by spatial position, is, however, a more powerful 
explanatory variable than political party. In fact, a spatial model clearly out- 
performs the economic models in the literature, even when party is included 
as an economic variable. 
To  demonstrate this point, we begin with the K-R study, in which the au- 
thors attempted to integrate the “economic” approach with a one-dimensional 
spatial model. The dimension is simply the nominal value of  the minimum 
wage. When an increase to $2.90 an hour is being voted against a status quo 
of $2.70, the cutting line should be to the right of the cutting line for a higher 
proposal of  $3.05 versus $2.70. That is, a more moderate proposal should 
attract broader  support.  The  K-R  study used  constituency characteristics 
(party, union  membership, wages,  unemployment, South, and  percentage 
black) and observed votes on the Bartlett and Tower amendments to estimate 
ideal points on minimum wages. 
The strength of  the K-R approach is that it incorporates the quantitative 
information about the wage levels directly into the analysis. The weakness is 
that, for the ideal points to be estimated accurately, the economic constituency 
variables must be highly correlated with the true ideal points. Unfortunately, 
the economic variables (including party as an economic variable) bear little 
relationship to the roll call votes they analyzed. As we  go on  to show,  the 
spatial model provides a much better accounting of the data and does so at a 
smaller cost in terms of estimated parameters. 
Our alternative procedure, to recapitulate, is to view ideal points on specific 
issues as arising from more general liberal-conservative or “ideological” pref- 
erences onto which specific issues, such as minimum wage, are mapped. We 
estimated our model using three alternative data sets. First, we used all roll 
calls from  1789 to  1985. We  investigated both one- and  two-dimensional 
models. This data set includes, except for those senators serving after 1985, 
all roll calls in a senator’s career. Second, we used only roll calls in 1977 prior 
to the votes on the Bartlett and Tower amendments. Third, we used all roll 
calls in the previous Congress (1975-76).  For this last data set, we  restrict 
classification computations to senators that had served in  1975-76.  For the 
second and third data sets, we report results only for one-dimensional models 
where we chose cutting lines to optimize classification, using the previously 
estimated ideal points as exogenous information. Thus, in  the second and 
third data sets, we are estimating one parameter per roll call. The K-R study 
estimates six to eight parameters in joint estimations covering both roll calls. 
The results appear in table 7.2. For those members serving in  1976, one- 
dimensional liberal-conservative coordinates correctly classify 93.3% of  the 
134 votes cast on the two minimum wage amendments. For all members vot- 227  The Spatial Mapping of  Minimum Wage Legislation 
Table 7.2  Classification Accuracy 
Percentage of Votes Correct 
Predictor  Bartlett  Tower  Combined  N 
A. Yes, No, Each Roll Call 
Spatial Models: 
1975-76  roll calls  95.8  90.5  93.3  134‘ 
Earlier 1977 roll calls  95.5  88.0  91.7  181b 
Dynamic NOMINATE, one-dimensional  91.0  88.0  89.7  181 
Dynamic NOMINATE,  two-dimensional  91 .O  91.3  91.2  181 
Marginals  80.9  65.2  73 .O  181 
B. Yes-Yes, No-Yes, No-No Both Roll Calls 
Dynamic NOMINATE,  two-dimensional  n.a.  n.a.  85.7  91‘ 
Khrebiel-Rivers  n.a.  n.a.  73.9-76.1  91 
MarEinals  n.a.  n.a.  68.1  91 
‘N reflects those serving in 1975-76  and voting in 1977. 
bN reflects those actually voting in 1977. 
‘N reflects those voting or announced on both Bartlett and Tower roll calls. 
ing, using coordinates estimated from all 1977 roll calls preceding the mini- 
mum wage votes, we correctly classify 91.7% of the 181 votes cast. 
We  also classified the votes using the coordinates estimated from our dy- 
namic model. In this case, the cutting line is a maximum-likelihood, rather 
than optimal classification, estimate. However, we again do quite well, cor- 
rectly classifying 89.7%. 
There is little payoff, on these roll calls, from using a two-dimensional 
model. For the Bartlett amendment, we make eight classification errors with 
both one- and two-dimensional models. With the Tower amendment, a second 
dimension reduces the errors from eleven to eight. The overall percentage 
correctly classified becomes 91.2%. The little gain is not  surprising since 
minimum wage had become a liberal-conservative “economic” issue by  1977 
(see below). 
To  have an appropriate baseline for comparison with K-R,  we  used our 
estimated cutting lines to classify senators into three classes: predicted yes on 
both amendments, predicted no on Bartlett but yes on Tower, and predicted 
no on both. (No senator was predicted yes-no, and no senator actually voted 
yes-no.) We  then compared actual votes to predicted votes and found that we 
had correctly classified 86% of the individual decision pairs. 
Our 13 classification errors seem unlikely to be “residuals” that can be rec- 
onciled by appeal to standard economic interests considerations. To  illustrate 
this point, we  consider the  13 errors in terms of  union membership, a key 228  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
independent variable in K-R, and the presence of  a right-to-work law.I2 Our 
two most serious errors were Danforth (R-Missouri) who voted yes-yes when 
predicted to vote no-no and Gam (R-Utah)  who voted no-no when predicted 
yes-yes. Neither deviation would seem to have an “economic” interpretation. 
Missouri was above the national average in union membership and did not 
have a right-to-work law, while Utah had a low degree of unionization and a 
right-to-work law. l3 Moreover, any economic considerations that would “ex- 
plain” Garn’s vote would “unexplain” the vote of Hatch, the other Republican 
senator from Utah. A similar inspection of the 11 less serious errors (no-yes 
predictions where the actual votes fell into the other two categories or vice 
versa) also failed to disclose any consistent pattern in terms of either unioniza- 
tion or right-to-work laws. The “errors” of the spatial model are likely to be 
linked as much to internal horse-trading within Congress as they are to under- 
lying economic interests in the constituencies. 
However, K-R’s results are much poorer; they are able to classify correctly 
only 74%-76% of  the individual voting decisions. (The percentage correct 
varies  over  alternative specifications.) Thus,  as  table  7.2 indicates,  their 
model only modestly betters the classification success that could be obtained 
by  simply using the marginal distribution of  votes to predict that everyone 
would vote as the majority voted (no-no).I4  (Of the 91 senators in the sample, 
68% fall into the modal class, no-no). 
We  also looked at the  1966 and  1970 Senate roll calls studied by  Bloch 
(1980). We achieved classification success of 90% and 86%, respectively, for 
these two roll calls. Bloch does not report classification success, but it is un- 
likely his results would better ours since his independent variables are a subset 
of those used by K-R.15 
The final earlier study we compare to our “ideological” approach is Silber- 
man and Durden (1976). They applied ordered probit to two 1973 House roll 
calls; the Erlenborn substitute and its final passage by the House.I6  The inde- 
pendent variables were a South dummy, campaign contributions to the 1972 
Congressional winner by labor, contributions by small business organizations, 
and measures of  low-wage workers and teen-age workers. It is difficult to 
compare this study to the spatial model as the authors report only the esti- 
mated coefficients. Two points can be made. 
First, the most statistically significant coefficients are the region dummy 
and the two campaign contribution coefficients. In this respect, we note that 
campaign contributions and region cannot be specifically linked to minimum 
wages but are relevant to a whole set of  interests that are captured by  our 
spatial coordinates. Indeed, as shown by Poole and Romer (1985) and Poole, 
Romer, and Rosenthal (1988), campaign contributions, particularly by labor, 
are highly related to spatial position. In other words, there is an identification 
problem. Region and campaign contributions have a logical relationship to 
minimum wage interests. On the other hand, they relate to a whole set of other 
interests as well. Since Southerners, for example, tend to vote as a bloc on a 229  The Spatial Mapping of  Minimum Wage Legislation 
whole set of issues, it is difficult to distinguish the economic impact specific 
to minimum wage from general regional interests. 
Second, campaign contributions do not measure within-constituency inter- 
ests. Since the contribution variables are contributions to the winning candi- 
date, variable values for individual districts will be highly sensitive to the 
outcomes of House races. Moreover, many contributors, such as the United 
Auto Workers or the National Association of  Manufacturers, are not local 
groups. So if the Silberman-Durden specification is valid (as against a Bloch 
or K-R), we will have to believe that, while economic interests may matter, 
they are not median voter interests. 
In  figure 7.4,  we  have  plotted  the  cutting lines and  shown the  cross- 
tabulation of the two roll calls. Table 7.3 contains the classification analysis. 
Excluding against-against types and individuals voting on only one of the 
roll calls (as did Silberman and Durden), we correctly classify 81% of  the 
joint decisions. The most serious errors occur in the upper-right and lower- 
left comers of  the table. These represent only  1% of  the representatives. 
(Classification of the two roll calls separately shows 89% for Erlenborn and 
87% for passage.) 
More research would be needed to ask if  the Silberman-Durden variables 
would account for the errors of  the spatial model. One of them clearly will 
not, at least on its own. An inspection of figure 7.4 shows that Southern Dem- 
ocrats are spread out over the three categories. There is not a strong pattern to 
the classification errors for southern representatives. 
To  summarize the results of this section, there appears to be little interest in 
using economic models once the spatial nature of voting has been recognized. 
Why do the economic variables fail to have an impact? 
We  hardly deny that economic interests are important to congressional de- 
cision making. But at this time, little progress has been made in either mod- 
eling or measuring those interests. As political scientists (Fiorina 1974; Fenno 
1978; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981) have long pointed out, a member 
of  Congress is an agent who faces a multitude of principals. Whose prefer- 
Table 7.3  Classification Analysis for the 1973 House  Votes 
Actual Vote 
Against Erlenbom,  For Erlenborn,  For Erlenbom, 
Predicted Vote  For Passage  For Passage  Against Passage 
Against Erlenborn,  188 
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ences-typical  constituents, registered voters in his or her party, party mili- 
tants, or campaign contributors not even resident in the district-are  operant 
is a complicated problem. And even if we knew whose preferences counted, 
measuring those preferences is likely to be at least as complicated as the cost 
benefit calculations of  Kalt and Zupan.  Simply using explanatory variables 
culled from government documents is unlikely to do the job.  On  the other 
hand, most of the time most of the relevant information gets picked up by the 
legislator's Euclidean coordinates. 
7.6  Minimum Wage Roll Calls in the House of Representatives, 
1937-83 
The highly spatial nature of  the handful of  minimum wage roll calls ana- 
lyzed in the literature is indeed generally true for the entire history of mini- 
mum wage roll calls. We  show this by considering the entire set of minimum 
wage roll calls that occurred in the House of  Representatives during the pe- 
riod,  1789-1985,  spanned by our dynamic estimation. The first roll call oc- 
curred in the 75th House in 1937, the last in the 98th House in 1983. 
In figure 7.5, we show the classification success for each roll call. The roll 
calls are inversely ordered by the size of  the majority. The bottom curve shows 
the classification success, equal to the size of  the majority, achieved by  the 
majority (marginals) model. The intermediate curve shows classification suc- 
cess for a one-dimensional estimation. The top curve is for two dimensions." 
The Congress number for each roll call appears above the top curve. It can be 
seen that the classification success is generally independent of the size of the 
majority. On roll calls where no one is close to being  pivotal,  gratuitous 
expressions of opinion can occur. For example, on the final passage of a bill, 
extreme liberals and extreme conservatives can both vote against and express 
their dissatisfaction with an inevitable compromise. But when the game is on 
the line, spatial considerations predominate. 
The spatial model provides a better accounting of  minimum wage voting 
after World War I1 than before. Voting on minimum wage occurred before the 
war in the 75th Congress, when the initial legislation was passed, and in the 
76th,  when  revisions were  considered.  Subsequently, new  legislation was 
made moot by  the command economy of  the war.  Divided government oc- 
curred in 1947-48,  with a Republican Congress and a Democratic president. 
In the labor area, the Republicans devoted their energies to overriding Tru- 
man's veto of  the Taft-Hartley Act. Minimum wages did not get considered 
until the 81st Congress. 
Consequently, we can divide the roll calls neatly into pre-World War I1 and 
post-World War  I1 samples. Classification of minimum wage roll calls using 
only the one-dimensional dynamic model is very high after World  War  11, 
averaging 88.2%,  but is much lower, at 71.2%,  before World War II.18 Mov- 
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Fig. 7.5  Minimum wage roll calls in the House, classification and model 
dimensionality 
Note:  The top line in the figure is broken by the Congress number for each roll call. The line 
shows the classification accuracy for the two dimensional model. The intermediate line shows 
the classification accuracy for the one dimensional model. The bottom line shows the 
percentage voting on the majority side. This line descends from left to right, since the roll calls 
are ordered by the size of the majority. 
War 11,  with classifications  jumping to 82.0% but still below the 88.6% ob- 
tained for the postwar period.I9 
Since the second dimension was needed to obtain good classifications in the 
prewar period, we know that initially minimum wage was an unusual, non- 
standard issue for its time. Conceivably, since our dynamic model is  con- 
strained to using the same abstract dimensions for an entire 200 years period, 
the second, vertical dimension, could capture the main lines of debate in cer- 
tain periods of history. But when we look across all roll calls, and not just at 
minimum wage roll calls, we find that since the  1850s the first, horizontal 
dimension has always dominated the second dimension in terms of classifica- 
tion (Poole and Rosenthal 1991, fig. 4).20  In particular, for the 75th and 76th 
Congresses, computing optimal classification cut points using the estimated 
legislator coordinates from the first dimension classifies over 80% of  the in- 
dividual decisions across all roll calls. Optimal classification for the second 
dimension results only in about 70% correct, barely better than the marginals. 
Comparable  results hold, by and large, for the postwar period. 
The finding that the second dimension is the key to classification of mini- 
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part of  the main line of  liberal-conservative conflict. Related to this result, 
figure 7.2 shows that, in terms of projections onto the horizontal dimension, 
Southern and Northern Democrats were not differentiated. As this differentia- 
tion increased, as shown in figure 7.3, Southern Democrats had become more 
similar to Republicans than to Northern Democrats on the horizontal dimen- 
sion,  and  the minimum wage  conflict turned  into a quintessential liberal- 
conservative battle. 
Another important point is made by the comparison of the prewar and post- 
war periods. The fact that, even in two dimensions, minimum wage voting is 
significantly less structured before World War I1 is indicative of the potential 
multidimensionality of  most economic legislation. Since, for example, the 
level of the wage can be traded off against the definition of which jobs will be 
covered, a vote between two alternative bills may not fit readily into the pre- 
existing  spatial pattern  of  voting.  The  complex nature  of  such  trade-offs 
should, we suggest, be most apparent in the initial legislative handling of an 
issue.  Eventually, however, the multidimensionality is packaged  and shoe- 
horned into the spatial structure. 
The packaging indeed results, at any one point in time, in minimum wage 
voting being nearly unidimensional. In figure 7.6, we plot the cutting line 
angles in chronological order. If  the votes were unidimensional at a point in 
time, all the angles for a year would be identical. While there is some varia- 
tion within years, it is quite small, particularly for roll calls with close (less 
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Table 7.4  Cutting Line Angles, IIme, and Margin 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2) 
Constant  3,385.37  3,291.22 
(268.1  I)  (260.56) 
Calendar year  -  1.667  -  1.622 
(.136)  (.132) 
(Year  x  Margina)/lOO  ,8059 
(.336) 
R=  .679  .703 
Standard error of estimate  15.037  14.467 
_______~~ 
Note: Dependent variable is cutting line angle in degrees. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
'Margin  = (%Yes -  %No(. 
than 65-35)  margins. (We have not yet carried out an estimation where all 
minimum wage roll calls in a Congress were constrained to have an identical 
angle.) 
In contrast, the angles vary strongly and linearly across time. In table 7.4, 
we present the results of a regression of the angle against a constant, calendar 
time, and roll call margin. Angle declines sharply with time, especially for 
close roll calls.21  The standard error of the estimate of  14.5 degrees indicates 
the small variability in angle within a give year. 
Results in Poole and Rosenthal(l991) help to understand why the angle has 
gradually shifted. At the beginning of  the New Deal, positions of Northern 
and Southern Democrats did not have significant differences. The Roosevelt 
coalition represented a reasonably coherent voting bloc. The civil rights issues 
introduced significant and increasing polarization within the party. The pas- 
sage of the Voting Rights Act in  1966, however, marked the beginning of  a 
period in which Southern Democrats have drifted back toward the party main- 
stream. 
This pattern is evidenced in figures 7.2-7.4.  By  1940, some of the separa- 
tion of  the Southern delegation had  occurred. They had  moved above the 
Northern Democrats on the vertical dimension but had not moved to the right 
on the horizontal dimension. By  1960, a time when civil rights began to dom- 
inate American domestic politics, Southern Democrats had made the full tran- 
sition. By  1977, there was less separation, and by the 1980s the regional dif- 
ferences among Democrats had dampened considerably (fig. 7.7-7.11). 
The changing positions of Southern Democrats are tracked by the minimum 
wage cutting lines. The opposition of Southern Democrats as well as Repub- 
licans to the initial minimum wage legislation led to a nearly horizontal cut- 
ting line before the war. As Southern Democrats, flush with the manna of the 
New Deal, switched from seeking to alleviate their economic situation vis-a- 
vis the North to seeking to protect the internal status quo vis-h-vis blacks, they 234  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
became more conservative on the economic dimension. The cutting line angle 
echoed this movement. 
While a standard economic explanation for the opposition of  the South is 
that minimum wages cause low-wage regions to lose their comparative advan- 
tage in attracting investment, an alternative view is that enfranchised whites 
in the South sought to maintain disenfranchised blacks in a low-wage situa- 
tion. Congressman Dies (&Texas)  was unambiguous on this point in stating: 
“There is a racial question involved here. Under this measure whatever is pre- 
scribed for one race must be prescribed for the others, and you cannot pre- 
scribe the same wages for the white man as the black man” (New York Times, 
14 December 1937). 
Later developments support the view that the race issue played a key role. 
First, as the debate on extending coverage unfolded after the war,  Southern 
Democrats fought hard to prevent extension to sectors such as tobacco where 
competition with the North was not an issue. Then, in the seventies, as South- 
ern Democrats acquired a black constituency, more of them became favorably 
disposed to increased minimum wages, even though Southern states had low 
levels of unionization and nearly all had right-to-work laws. Concurrent with 
the new liberalism among Southem Democrats, liberal Republicans became a 
vanishing breed. Echoing this movement, the cutting line became nearly ver- 
tical. 
7.7  Minimum Wage in the 1980s 
The most recent developments in minimum wage legislation are a micro- 
cosm of the long-term historical analysis of the preceding section. With the 
election of  Ronald  Reagan and  a Republican Senate in  1980, the  debate 
shifted from increases in the nominal wage to retrenchment of coverage in the 
form of administration proposals for a subminimum wage for teenagers. The 
subminimum wage, however, was not successful in the Democratic controlled 
House. 
It is interesting that one factor that contributed to the impasse on the sub- 
minimum wage was the failure of McDonald’s and other large fast-food chains 
to support the proposal. These large-market-share firms preferred not to risk 
their consumer image.22  In  contrast,  the  National  Restaurant Association, 
which represented many small firms, supported the proposal. It is also pos- 
sible that large firms saw wage regulation as enforcing their competitive ad- 
vantage with respect to smaller firms. In any event, it appears that oligopoly 
coupled with an active media may result in outcomes that anticipate legisla- 
tion and vitiate much of the agenda of Republican conservatives. 
As soon as control of the Senate switched back to the Democrats after the 
1986 elections, proposals for an increase in the wage began to make their way 
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impetus from these proposals until a “kinder, gentler” George Bush endorsed 
an increase in the minimum wage during his campaign. 
The new Bush administration proposed an increase to $4.25 an hour over 
three years and a training wage, equal to 80% of the minimum, to be paid to 
new workers in the first six months on the job. Democratic bills were intro- 
duced in the House and Senate. The relevant committees were chaired by two 
ultraliberals, Augustus Hawkins in  the House and Edward Kennedy in the 
Senate. Hawkins’s committee reported out a bill calling for an increase to 
$4.65 without a training wage. A GOP substitute bill, containing the admin- 
istration’s proposals, was rejected. However, the Hawkins bill was known to 
be in disfavor at the White House. It was amended via a “compromise,” of- 
fered by  Murphy (D-Pennsylvania)  that subsequently passed as the House 
bill. This called for an increase to $4.55 and a training wage set at 85%  of the 
minimum wage with sharp restrictions on the conditions and time for which 
the training wage would apply. The president indicated he would veto this bill, 
and  the passage vote of  248 to  171 clearly indicated a veto would be sus- 
tained. Nonetheless, the Democratic leadership chose to invite the veto by 
proceeding to pass a nearly identical bill in the Senate and to gain acceptance 
of the conference report in both Houses. 
After the president vetoed the bill and the veto override failed, the White 
House and the Democratic congressional leadership negotiated. The suppos- 
edly powerful committee chairs were reportedly frozen out of the negotia- 
tions. Bush got his way on the level-the  final bill went no higher than $4.25. 
But he  agreed to a two-year rather than three-year phase-in, to restrict the 
training wages to teenagers, and to make the limit 85% rather than 80%. 
There are three key lessons in this scenario. First, politics has symbolic, as 
well as real, victories. The Republicans finally got the teenage training wage 
but at a higher level than the $2.50 an hour (75% of the $3.35 minimum wage 
then in effect) proposed by the Reagan administration. The Democrats got an 
increase in the nominal wage but at a level that barely dents the erosion of the 
seventies and eighties. Second, committee chairs do not always carry the clout 
found in other discussions (e.g., Weingast and Moran 1983). Third, attempts 
to model the interaction between committees, the two Houses, and the presi- 
dent, as a game with a small number of stages may be misplaced. The actual 
process appears to be pure bilateral bargaining between a Democratic legisla- 
ture  and  a Republican executive in which both parties have veto powers. 
While Bush could successfully veto any bill that did not match his proposal, 
the Democrats could prevent any bill from passing. Since both parties were 
committed to a bill, negotiated compromise occurred. 
The voting process continued to fit into our spatial model. The votes oc- 
curred in the lOlst Congress. Our dynamic estimation ended with the 99th 
Congress and full data on the lOlst Congress is not available. Consequently, 
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and then analyzed the 1989 votes of those members who had served in both 
Congresses. Thus, the remaining analysis is based on spatial positions esti- 
mated from votes that occurred prior to the minimum wage votes. 
The very first House roll call, a procedural motion to accept the rule on the 
bill (fig. 7.7) was nearly a straight party-line vote. The few defectors tended, 
as called for in the spatial model, to be in the moderate wings of their parties. 
Searching for optimal classification found a cutting line that had only 15  er- 
rors of  382 voting, paired, or announced. The first substantive vote in the 
House concerned the GOP substitute (fig. 7.8). Many Southern Democrats 
were attracted by this proposal. On the other hand, some liberal Republicans 
defected. Again, spatial positions from 1987-88  successfully picked out the 
likely supporters and opponents of the substitute. The substitute lost by only 
20 votes; the margin is partly represented by Republican losses since the early 
Reagan years, partly by  the increasingly liberal character of  the Southern 
Democrats. On this  vote,  we  had  31 classification errors of  389 voting, 
paired, or announced. 
Most other votes were intermediate between these two, with fewer South- 
ern Democrat defections than occurred on the GOP substitute bill. One vote 
that was not was the final passage vote on November 1, shown in figure 7.9. 
The spatial model presumes a choice between two alternatives. But final pas- 
sage is often an opportunity for extremists to voice their displeasure. Negative 
votes were cast not only by the right wing of the Republican party but also by 
two literal Democrats, Miller (California) and Perkins (Kentucky). For Re- 
publicans, the bill went too far, for the two liberals, not far enough. Since 
many final passage votes involve mainly symbolic protest, they should typi- 
cally not be treated in either spatial or economic analyses. 
The Senate exhibited patterns similar to the House. A cutting line can be 
found for the GOP substitute vote that results in only five errors (fig. 7.10). 
All Democrats are predicted to vote against the substitute. All but one of the 
Republicans voting against the substitute were on the liberal end of the party. 
The one exception was Jesse Helms, so opposed to any form of  minimum 
wage that he voted  against the administration bill.  Economic models like 
those discussed earlier would also fail to capture this form of protest voting. 
Finally, as seen in figure 7.1  1, the vote to kill the Gramm (R-Texas)  amend- 
ment shows that strategic considerations do little to upset the spatial pattern 
of voting. Gramm proposed to strike from the final bill a provision that kept 
teenagers in agriculture from being paid the subminimum rather than the min- 
imum wage. Voting  to kill the amendment introduced by this conservative 
Republican was in fact supporting the president’s position. Republicans Waf- 
fled between their support for the president’s negotiated compromise and their 
preferences for lower minimum wages. The motion was made by Strom Thur- 
mond (R-South  Carolina) who then voted against his own motion. The waf- 
fling also resulted in fairly noisy voting by  the more liberal Republicans. 
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voting. Because Southern Democrats are now increasingly like other Demo- 
crats, the motion passed easily. (Only two Democrats were predicted to vote 
against the motion.) 
Roll call voting on minimum wage during the Bush administration remains, 
in summary, a highly partisan matter. 
7.8  Is Support for Minimum Wage Waning? 
Until this point, we have indicated that minimum wage voting obeys a spa- 
tial mapping. While the mapping has always been present, outcomes have 
differed dramatically,  with the real  minimum wage  first rising  sharply and 
then, since 1968, falling sharply. Indeed, the minimum wage has lagged, in 
real terms, minimum wages in other countries where the standard of living is 
not above that of the United States. For example, in the mid-l980s,  the mini- 
mum wage was about $4.65 an hour in Belgium (Emerson 1988) and France 
(Rotbart 1989) when it was $3.35 in the United States. 
Part of the falling minimum wage in the United States may be attributed to 
Republican resurgence. On the other hand, while minimum wage voting may 
always be spatially patterned, the induced mapping of the real wage may well 
have changed. The “ideal” real minimum wage of a legislator with the same 
relative degree of “liberalness” may have fallen over the past two decades. We 
need to compute the spatial mapping of the real wage. 
Making comparisons is difficult because each bill is in fact a multiattribute 
item.  As  a  result,  we  will  only  work  through  some  rough,  back-of-the- 
envelope calculations. 
We  find that the cutting lines of the Tower amendment in 1977 and the GOP 
substitute bill in 1989 similarly partition senators serving in both years.23  In 
particular, Senator Lugar, who took the conservative position both in 1977 and 
1989 and Senators Hatfield, Packwood, and Heinz, who voted with the liber- 
als both times, were reasonably close to both cutting lines. Therefore, if  we 
can map a wage to a cutting line in both cases, we can get a rough estimate of 
how  the preferences of  moderate Republicans have changed over time.  If 
those senators now have lower support for a real minimum wage, the assump- 
tions underlying the spatial model force the conclusion that the ideal points of 
all senators shifted in the direction of lower support. 
As K-R point out, the Tower amendment was  in fact a vote between the 
proposals of Tower and Williams. Tower proposed increases to $2.65 in 1978, 
$2.85 in 1979, and $3.05 in 1980. Williams proposed $2.65 in 1978, $2.90 
in  1979, $3.15 in  1980, and $3.40 in  1981. Here K-R do not deal with the 
problems posed by  the differences in the schedules. Rather than attempt to 
deal with discounted streams and anticipated inflation rates, we simply com- 
pare the 1980 wages and impute a value of $3.10 to the cutting lines. In 1988 
dollars, this amounts to $4.45. 
The 1989 vote on the GOP substitute is also complicated by multiattribute 
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ing wage as well as a lower minimum wage. Nonetheless, we compare the 
1991 wages of $4.55 in the Democratic substitute and $4.25 in the GOP sub- 
stitute and impute a cutting line value of $4.40 or $3.81 in 1988 dollars. Com- 
paring the $4.45 figure from 1977 to $3.81 for 1989 suggests an ebbing sup- 
port for minimum wage. The differential would be greater if one argued that 
the inflation of the late seventies was largely unanticipated or that inflation in 
1990 and 1991 will exceed our assumed 5% rate. On the other hand, the dif- 
ferential would be  less if  one argued that senators were conditioning their 
votes with a view  to adopting a bill that would win presidential approval. 
Carter’s acquiescence to labor demands and Bush’s firmness may have influ- 
enced the spatial mapping in the legislative branch. 
7.9  Conclusion 
We have traced out how minimum wage voting fits into the spatial structure 
of congressional voting and indicated that the spatial structure better accounts 
for the data than  statistical analyses based on constituency characteristics. 
Voting on minimum wage bills is a highly partisan, liberal-conservative mat- 
ter. Over time, the mapping of wages into the spatial structure has probably 
changed. Individual legislators who supported a given real wage in the sev- 
enties probably prefer a somewhat lower real wage today. 
Much work remains to be done on the multiattribute nature of the bills. 
Specifically, we need to investigate the interaction between the level of  the 
wage and coverage. 
The major policy implication of our research for those interested in affect- 
ing the level of the minimum wage is that they should direct their attention not 
to forming realigning coalitions on the issue but rather to moving the location 
of  the “cutting” line that separates liberals from conservatives along the di- 
mension that represents the stable mapping. Still, reasoned argument is likely 
to be far less important than changing control. Given the Democratic lock on 
the House, Republicans can affect change only by allowing inflation to erode 
the value of the nominal wage. On the other hand, any presidential landslide 
for the Democrats would be likely to lead rapidly to a minimum wage indexed 
to about 50% of the average wage in manufacturing. 
If we think it is likely that Democrats will pursue their traditional platform, 
it is partly because we think that the eighties were mostly business as usual in 
American politics. The parallels between Nixon and Reagan are as striking as 
the differences. Both were elected after overseas debacles by  the Democrats. 
Both were reelected by landslides. Both began their administrations by advo- 
cating a subminimum training wage. Both saw no increase in the minimum 
wage during their first terms. Nixon finally conceded on minimum wage when 
the Watergate scandal hit early in his second term. More speculatively, Bush’s 
campaign promises on the minimum wage  may  have  been  one of  several 
moves to moderation induced by a fall in Republican popularity from the Iran- 
Contra scandal, which hit late in Reagan’s second term. In any event, the 244  Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
minimum wage continues to be hostage to the  larger ebb and flow of  liberal 
and  conservative fortunes. 
Notes 
1.  In our descriptive account of minimum wage legislation, we  have relied on a 
number of secondary sources, mainly various volumes of Congress and the Nation and 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, both published by  Congressional Quarterly 
Press. 
2.  Similar conclusions pertain to other evaluations. The minimum wage as a per- 
centage of the poverty line gives similar results. The minimum wage, as a percentage 
of the average wage in manufacturing, rose to 50% in 1950 and remained at that level 
through  1968. Subsequently, it fell gradually below 50% until  1980, after which it 
declined sharply. 
3.  Most increases in the wage have become effective  after the first year but before 
the end of  a party’s reign in the White House. There are two exceptions. In  1961, a 
raise became effective in Kennedy’s first year. In 1981, a raise, voted in 1977, took 
effect in  Reagan’s  first year.  To  give Kennedy the raise he supported and to avoid 
giving the Republicans a raise engendered by a unified Democratic government, we 
coded Carter’s presidency as having lasted through 1981 and Republican control of the 
Senate as lasting from 1982 to 1987. Very similar results were produced by moving all 
terms of office forward one year. 
4.  These results are based on logarithmic regressions. The regression slopes were 
sufficiently close to 1  .O that we chose to base the discussion in terms of means. Adding 
terms for trend, trend squared, and a post-sixties dummy did not improve the fit. 
5.  We follow Congressional Quarterly in defining the South as the 11 Confederacy 
states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma. 
6. The estimation was carried out on the Cyber 205 and ETA-10 supercomputers at 
the John Von Neumann National Supercomputing  Center. 
7.  The space in the figures is 1.8 units square. Bootstrap results presented in Poole 
and Rosenthal(l991) suggest that about 75% of the first dimension coordinates of the 
representatives have standard errors less than 0.03 and 99% have standard errors less 
than 0.05. (Although the bootstrap results are for a one-dimensional estimation, the 
first dimension coordinates from the two-dimensional model correlate over 0.99 with 
the  one-dimensional coordinates).  Bootstrap  results  are  not  available  for  two- 
dimensional problems, but it is highly likely that the points in the figure are very pre- 
cisely estimated relative to the range of the space. 
8. In this context, the argument made by “distributive politics” advocates that party 
is not a constraint on politicians appears to be overstated (e.g., Marshall and Weingast 
1988). If  voting were independent of party, we would not see the party clusters in the 
figures. In fact, party discipline and leadership, even in the modern era, may well be 
the key  to explaining why politics, potentially  explosively multidimensional (Riker 
1982), looks as if  nearly  all issues can  be  placed  in  a low-dimensional space.  For 
example, Ferejohn (1986) details how the Democratic leadership bundled agricultural 
subsidies and food stamps into a single piece of omnibus legislation that represents an 
institutionalized logroll. Our analysis of roll call votes on this issue suggests that the 
logroll is not a coalition of fann interests and urban interests but of Democratic repre- 
sentatives from farming areas and urban representatives. 
9.  We thank Tom Romer for drawing our attention to the economics literature on 
roll call voting and for participating in the reanalysis of the Kalt and Zupan data. 245  The Spatial Mapping of Minimum Wage Legislation 
10.  It is interesting to note that a similar debate took place when the initial mini- 
mum wage legislation was drafted in 1937-38.  Some members of Congress pressed for 
setting the minimum wage by independent commission. Similarly, during the 1988-89 
debate, liberals advocated a commission that would propose future  adjustments to the 
wage. 
11.  The votes on the Interstate Commerce Act in the House are in fact much like 
minimum wage. The spatial model works well. 
12.  Our data is for 1975. Our source is the Statistical Abstract ofthe United States 
(1988,415). 
13.  Gam’s votes in 1977 are even more puzzling when one observes that he was a 
stalwart opponent of minimum wage increases in 1988. 
14.  To  be fair, we  point out that the intent of K-R  was to present a methodology 
rather than to contribute to our understanding of  minimum wages. They were in part 
motivated by  what they saw (p. 1158) as a consistency problem with our scaling pro- 
cedures. In Poole and Rosenthal (1991), we present extensive Monte Car10 evidence 
that shows that consistency need not be a concern. K-R (1988) also has problems as a 
methodological piece. Equations (6),  (7), and (1  1) contain errors that lead to an incor- 
rect result for the covariance matrix. 
15.  Another problem  with  the Bloch study is that the votes analyzed were final 
passage votes. These generally tend to be “Hurrah” votes with large majorities. The 
key votes generally tend to be earlier votes on amendments or substitute bills. See our 
later discussion of the 1989 legislation. 
16.  The bill passed by  the House went to the Senate and to conference. After the 
House accepted the conference report, the bill was vetoed by President Nixon. 
17.  Both estimations are for models where legislator positions were constrained to 
be a linear function of time. 
18.  The t-statistic for the null hypothesis of equality is 8.600. 
19.  The r-statistic for equality is 2.072. Since we  hypothesize that classifications 
improve as new issues result in permanent legislation, a one-tailed test is appropriate, 
withp = .021. 
20.  We get very similar results when we evaluate the estimation in terms of geomet- 
ric mean probability of observed choices, a measure based directly on the likelihood 
function. For simplicity, we focus on classification  in this paper. 
21.  This regression provides a better description than the use of a pre-World War I1 
dummy variable. Examination of the residuals did not suggest that margin was a source 
of heteroscedasticity. 
22.  An  analogous situation appears to be the recent ban, initiated by  H. J. Heinz 
(Starkist) on canning tuna caught in nets that trap dolphins. Heinz is a highly visible 
firm with over one-third of the tuna market. A similar ban would, it seems, be unlikely 
to arise in a market with only very small canners. 
23.  With comprehensive  data for all roll calls from 1989, we could include the 1977 
and the  1989 votes in a dynamic estimation. This would be a preferable method for 
checking the comparability of the two votes. 
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Comment  Charles Brown 
Much of  the analysis of the politics of minimum wage legislation by econo- 
mists emphasizes both economic (rational choice) models of legislator behav- 
ior and economic differences as the ultimate explanatory variables in predict- 
ing  legislative votes.  Poole and  Rosenthal,  on  the  other hand,  emphasize 
ideological factors-in  effect,  positions on  apparently unrelated  roll  call 
votes-which  turn out to permit quite accurate discrimination between those 
favoring higher and lower minimum wage increases. 
Based on similarities and differences on virtually all roll call votes in each 
Congress,  they  assign each  legislator a  “position” in  a hypothetical two- 
dimensional space. Much like factor analysis, the computer finds the dimen- 
sions and the analyst brings the labels. Poole and Rosenthal identify their 
more important dimension as general liberalkonservative leanings, and the 
other as attitudes on racial questions; this second dimension serves to separate 
Northern and Southern Democrats. 
The key point is that these “positions”-in  effect, scores on two hypotheti- 
cal variables-are  based on votes in general, not votes on minimum wage 
questions in particular. To  relate these general positions to minimum wage 
votes, they find the “line” relating the two variables that distinguishes those 
who vote “yea” on  a particular minimum-wage vote from those who vote 
“nay.” Finding such a line in effect estimates two parameters; the resulting line 
lets one “predict” more than 90 percent of  the votes on a minimum wage- 
related question, versus more than 80% for roll call votes in general. 
I find the result that a one- or two-dimensional characterization of  general 
voting stance predicts minimum wage votes well an interesting but not a sur- 
prising one-the  minimum wage controversy in Congress is a liberals-versus- 
conservatives affair. (It would be interesting to see how Poole and Rosenthal’s 
“spatial” variables would do in predicting legislators’ choice between mini- 
mum wage increases and the Earned Income Tax Credit in raising the after-tax 
earnings of the low-paid. My guess is that positions would be harder to pre- 
dict.) On the other hand, the later finding that North-South splits among the 
Democrats have been reduced (as the Southerners respond to enfranchisement 
of blacks) was both interesting and unexpected. 
Poole and Rosenthal then argue that their “spatial” model predicts better 
than “economic” models. They are able to compare their predictions against 
those based constituent characteristics (e.g., wage levels and union member- 
ship) as reported by  Krehbiel and Rivers (1988). They achieve much more 
accurate discrimination between minimum wage supporters and opponents 
than do Krehbiel and Rivers, and they use considerably fewer parameters (two 
vs. six, including one reflecting the influence of party membership). 
Those attached to constituent-characteristic models will detect a tilt in the 
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track on which this horse race is run. The race between “political” and “eco- 
nomic” models here is very much like that between “time-series” and “struc- 
tural” models in macroeconomics. While the former often provide more ac- 
curate predictions, the latter (arguably) give deeper insights into why things 
are changing. Similarly, one could argue that “economic” models are atrempr- 
ing to explain why some legislative districts are represented by those who rank 
high  in  Poole and  Rosenthal’s conservative dimension,  while their model 
“merely” confirms that whatever explains the general pattern of  other votes 
will explain minimum wage votes too. Indeed, if one did nor see a high degree 
of  consistency  across  votes,  this  would  be  puzzling  for  a  constituent- 
characteristics model.’ 
I do, however, believe that Poole and Rosenthal have a point, that positions 
on the minimum wage are part of a larger mosaic of positions, and that larger 
mosaic (which they would call ideology) is important in  understanding the 
politics of the minimum wage. One does not get very far in understanding the 
Autoworkers’ or Steelworkers’ support for minimum wages by  focusing on 
their desire to exclude lower-cost labor: if their deepest fear was that Pintos or 
pig iron would be manufactured by nonunion U.S. workers making less than 
$3.90 an hour, they would sleep very well indeed. 
Poole and Rosenthal note that constituent-characteristic models will have a 
hard time explaining why Senators Gam and Hatch (same party, same constit- 
uents) would ever disagree. This suggests to me an empirical strategy to sup- 
plement the results reported in the paper: What sort of  predictive accuracy 
would one get (in Senate votes) using state dummy variables (and perhaps 
party)? Since senators from the same state have the same constituents, the 
dummy variables give an upper bound of how well we might ever hope to do 
with an “ideal” set of constituent variables, at least for Senate votes. 
Poole and Rosenthal also argue their model’s predictions compare with 
those of  Silberman and Durden, whose “economic” model includes amount 
received from unions and from small business as well as constituent charac- 
teristics. Poole and Rosenthal note that adding these variables moves things in 
the direction of a model like theirs (contributions depend on general orienta- 
tion more than on an individual vote like the minimum wage). Unfortunately, 
Silberman and Durden did not report how many votes their model predicted 
correctly, so we really cannot tell whether Poole and Rosenthal’s approach is 
stronger or weaker than theirs. 
Poole and Rosenthal then argue that the real value of the minimum wage 
preferred by Congress has been falling. This conclusion rests on a comparison 
of votes on the Tower amendment in  1977 and the GOP substitute bill in 1989. 
These produced very similar partitions of the Senators voting on both, but the 
alternatives at stake on the former vote were higher than those on the latter- 
hence the inference that a lower real minimum is preferred. In addition to 
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problems that come from other provisions of the bills, which the paper notes, 
there is also the fact that the 1989 discussion concerned a larger increase (at a 
time of lower expected inflation) than the 1977 vote.* Consequently, agnosti- 
cism on the question of Congress’s preferences over time seems the safer ver- 
dict to me. 
A fine paper ends on a terribly speculative note: “any presidential landslide 
for the Democrats would be likely to lead rapidly to a minimum wage indexed 
at roughly 50 percent of the average wage in manufacturing.” My own predic- 
tion is that a Democratic landslide would require a Democratic focus that 
demonstrates some independence of organized labor. If labor-led Democratic 
victories of the past  could  not  produce an  indexed minimum wage,  why 
should the next (less labor-led) one do so? 
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